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The Fire-Breathing Dragon and the Cute, Cuddly Panda:
The Implication of China's Rise for Developing
Countries, Human Rights, and Geopolitical Stability
Randall Peerenboom*t
China's rapid emergence as a major world power over the last twenty-eight
years has produced shock and awe.' Leaders of rich and poor countries alike
envy the high growth rates. Nobel laureate economists praise China
policymakers for their pragmatic approach and wise choices, with a majority
predicting that China will have the largest economy in seventy-five years if not
sooner. Pundits proclaim the victory of the so-called Beijing Consensus ("BC")
over the Washington Consensus ("WC"). International developing agencies
admire China's remarkable success in reducing poverty, raising literacy rates, and
increasing longevity. Proponents of the new law and development movement
note that China has been more successful than most countries at its income level
in implementing rule of law and achieving good governance.
On one hand, China seems to be a paradigm of a successful developing
country. In 2004, the World Bank hosted a conference in Shanghai attended by
more than 1,200 participants from 117 countries to discuss what other countries
could learn from China's experience. 2 On the other hand, China's rise has been
accompanied by fear-even hysteria. In the eyes of its harshest critics, China is a
godless regime that brutally oppresses its people. Opposition to China is
particularly intense because China is both the Soviet Union, the rising military
menace, and Japan, the rising mercantilist economic power engaging in "unfair"
*

Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. E-mail: peerenboom@law.uda.edu.

t
I

The Chicago Journal of InternationalLaw expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of this Article's
Chinese citations and references.
This article draws on arguments discussed at greater length in Randall Peerenboom, China

2

Modernizes: Threat to the West orModelfor the Rest? (Oxford, forthcoming 2006).
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Development Results: Experiencefrom the Shanghai GlobalLearning Process, Development Outreach (Oct
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trade practices and threatening to "buy up America" all rolled into one. For
these new post-Cold War warriors, China must be prevented from becoming so
powerful as to challenge American supremacy. China's ascendancy must
therefore be fought at every juncture: economically, politically, and militarily.
China is not the fire-breathing dragon portrayed by its critics. But neither is
it the cute, cuddly panda as portrayed by Beijing's spin-doctors. China's rise will
require an adjustment in the world order. The United States and Western
countries will have to accept that China has its own legitimate interests, and that
those interests will at times conflict with the interests of the United States and
other powers.
Part I explores the implications of China's rise for the new law and
development movement, and suggests that the success of China and other East
Asian states offers important lessons for other developing countries, even if not
all countries will be able to, or will want to, follow the East Asian Model
("EAM"). Part II explores the implications of China's rise for the human rights
movement, focusing on the implications for civil and political rights, the right to
development, global inequality, and humanitarian intervention. Part III considers
whether China's rise will lead to geopolitical instability, and what can be done to
prevent this. Part IV concludes with some thoughts on United States-China
relations and the recent speech by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick
encouraging China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international
order.3
Some cautionary caveats are in order. First, it is by no means certain that
China's growth and development will continue. Many lower income countries
make some initial progress and show improvement in terms of economic
growth, institutional development and good governance given their low starting
points. However, once they reach the middle income level, they get bogged
down. Powerful interest groups capture the reform agenda, opposing further
reforms or pushing for reforms that do not benefit the general public. Economic
growth slows or reverses, and the reform momentum is dissipated. Some states
settle into a stable but dysfunctional holding pattern, while others sink into
chaos and become failed states. There are already signs of reform fatigue and
diminishing returns in China. Future progress will require the political will to
press ahead with deeper economic, social, legal, and political reforms. Despite
the obstacles, there is reason to be optimistic, given China's performance to date
and the exceptional success of other East Asian states.

3

Robert B. Zoellick, Whither China: From Membershb to Rt{onsibihiy?,Address at the Meeting of the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (Sept 21, 2005), available online at
<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm> (visited May 7, 2006).
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Second, even if growth continues, it will be decades before China's
economy reaches the size of the American economy. Even then, per capita
income will be much lower. While China currently has the fourth largest
economy, per capita income is only about $1,300, compared to over $40,000 in
the United States.4
Third, much will depend on whether China democratizes, when it does so,
and what type of democracy it becomes. While space limitations prevent a
discussion of these issues, I consider how the outcomes might differ, for better
or worse, if China becomes democratic.'
Finally, assuming China continues to modernize, there will be further
convergence on the institutions and practices found in other wealthy modern
societies, most of which are in Europe and North America. However, capitalism,
rule of law, democracy, and human rights-the hallmarks of modernity-are
sufficiently contested in theory and varied in practice that the final outcome in
China cannot be specified at this point, much to the chagrin of those who would
press their own version of liberal democracy on China. As China negotiates
modernity, and indeed post-modernity, it may very well give rise to one or more
novel varieties of capitalism, rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Yet there
is enough minimal determinate content to each of these four aspects to provide
a teleological orientation to the process that is likely to survive into the next
decades, barring extraordinary catastrophes that radically change the nature of
contemporary society.
I. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
China's march to superpower status, along with the economic recovery in
Asia after the financial crisis, has renewed interest in the EAM. The EAM-a
notion which admittedly serves a useful purpose only at a high level of
generalization and conceals considerable diversity when subject to closer
scrutiny-involves:
(i) an emphasis on economic growth rather than civil and especially
political rights during the initial stages of development, with a period
of rapid economic growth occurring under authoritarian regimes;

4

See Global Income per Capitafrom World Bank Development Indicators, available online at <http:/I
www.fmfacts.com/bizlO/globalworldincomepercapita.htm> (visited May 7, 2006).
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See Peerenboom, China Modernizes (cited in note 1); Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March
toward Rule of Law (Cambridge 2002); David Bachman, China's DemocrairZation: What Difference
Would It Makefor U.S.-China Relations?, in Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McConnick, eds, What
If China Doesn't DemocrafiZe? Implicationsfor War and Peace(M.E. Sharpe 2000). For a more optimistic
view, see Bruce Gilley, China's Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Load
(Columbia 2004).
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(ii) a pragmatic approach to reforms, with governments following some
aspects of the WC and rejecting or modifying others; in particular,
with governments adopting most of the basic macroeconomic
principles of the WC for the domestic economy; rejecting or
modifying the neoliberal aspects that would greatly reduce the role of
the state through rapid privatization and deregulation, with the state
also more active in reducing poverty and in ensuring minimal material
standards to compete in a more competitive global economy;6 and
modifying the prescribed relationship between the domestic and
global economy by gradually exposing the domestic economy to
international competition while offering some protection to key
sectors and some support to infant industries;
(iii) as the economy grows and wealth is generated, the government invests
in human capital and in institutions, including reforms to establish a
legal system that meets the basic Fullerian requirements of a
procedural or thin rule of law;7 over time, as the legal system becomes
more efficient, professionalized, and autonomous, it comes to play a
greater role in the economy and society more generally;
(iv) democratization in the sense of freely contested, multiple-party
elections for the highest level of office is postponed until a relatively
high level of wealth is attained;

6

China has learned this lesson the hard way. While China has done reasonably well in addressing
poverty, the focus on aggregate economic growth has led to rising inequality. In addition, the
relatively low amount of public spending on education and health, combined with a turn toward
market forces in the health sector, has increased social tensions. In recent years, to remedy these
problems, the government has begun to increase public spending on education, health, and
welfare services.
See Lon Fuller, The Moraliy of Law 33-38 (Yale 1964). Thin rules of law refer to procedural rules
while thick rules of law generally refer to substantive theories. Briefly put
[a] thin theory stresses the formal or instrumental aspects of rule of lawthose features that any legal system allegedly must possess to function
effectively as a system of laws, regardless of whether the legal system is part of
a democratic or non-democratic society, capitalist or socialist, liberal or
theocratic. Although proponents of thin interpretations of rule of law define it
in slightly different ways, there is considerable common ground, with many
building on or modifying Lon Fuller's influential account that laws be general,
public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and
enforced. In contrast to thin versions, thick or substantive conceptions begin
with the basic elements of a thin concept of rule of law but then incorporate
elements of political morality such as particular economic arrangements (freemarket capitalism, central planning, etc.), forms of government (democratic,
single party socialism, etc.), or conceptions of human rights (liberal,
communitarian, "Asian values," etc.).
Peerenboom, China's Long March at 3 (cited in note 5).
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(v) constitutionalism begins to emerge during the authoritarian period,
including the development of constitutional norms and the
strengthening of institutions; social organizations start to emerge and
"civil society" begins to develop, albeit often a civil society with a
different nature and political orientation than in Western liberal
democracies, and with organizations with a political agenda subject to
limitations; citizens enjoy economic liberties, rising living standards for
the vast majority, and some civil and political rights, although with
limitations especially on rights that involve political issues and affect
the control of the regime; judicial independence remains limited, with
the protection of the full range of human rights and in particular civil
and political rights suffering accordingly; and
(vi) there is greater protection of civil and political rights after
democratization, including rights that involve sensitive political issues,
although with ongoing abuses of rights in some cases and with rights
frequently given a communitarian or collectivist interpretation rather
than a liberal interpretation.
This summary of the EAM very roughly describes the arc of several Asian
states, albeit with countries at various levels of economic wealth and legal system
development, and with political regimes ranging from democracies to semidemocracies to socialist states. South Korea and Taiwan have high levels of
wealth, rule-of-law compliant legal systems, democratic government, and
constitutionalism. Japan does as well, although it is a special case given its early
rise economically and the post-War colonial influence of the United States on
legal and political institutions. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia are also
wealthy, with legal systems that fare well in terms of rule of law, but are either
not democratic (Hong Kong) or are non-liberal democracies dominated by a
single party (Singapore and Malaysia). Thailand, less wealthy than the others, has
democratized, but has a weaker legal system and, under Prime Minister Thaksin,
has adopted policies that emphasize growth and social order rather than civil and
political liberties.' China and Vietnam are at an earlier stage. Although China is a
lower-middle income country and Vietnam is a low-income country, both have
legal systems that outperform the average in their income class but are still

8

Thaksin at one point rejected the EAM because of the low rates of growth in the more mature
economies and the overdependence on cheap labor to fuel growth. However, he later recanted,
claiming that his government was not abandoning the EAM but trying to build on and improve it.
Thaksinomics involves running the country like a company, emphasizing equitable growth,
promoting competition through marketization while protecting and directing credit to certain
domestic industries, depressing the exchange rate to promote exports, promoting regional trade,
and bringing the informal economy into the formal sector. See Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris
Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Poliics in Thailand99-133 (NIAS 2004).
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weaker than the rest. They remain effectively single-party socialist states, with
varying degrees and areas of political openness.
There are also examples of less successful paths in Asia (and elsewhere).
Some involve countries that democratized at lower levels of wealth: Indonesia,
India, the Philippines, and Cambodia. Others involve authoritarian systems that
failed to invest in human capital and institutions: North Korea, Laos, and
Myanmar.9 The latter tend to have the weakest legal systems and are mired in
poverty, with all of the human suffering that it entails. When authoritarianism
fails, it fails badly.
A. THE EAM, THE

WC,

AND THE BC

The experiences of Asian countries shed light on three of the main points
of contention in the debates over neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus, and
the Beijing Consensus and the relationship between them:'0 whether the WC
requires neoliberalism's minimalist state; whether the principles of the WC are to
be applied without adaptation in all countries; and whether the BC entails a
wholesale rejection of the WC.
As for the first issue, according to John Williamson, the economist who
first articulated the WC, the WC was never intended to minimize the role of the
state. Thus, WC proponents today need not and should not subscribe to
populist interpretations that equate the WC with neoliberalism, market
fundamentalism, Reagonomics, and Thatcherism-in short, the mentality of
"let's bash the state, the markets will resolve everything."'" This may be an
accurate reflection of Williamson's thinking at the time or an attempt to rewrite
history. In any event, the view that states and the international community need
to play a bigger role in alleviating poverty than suggested by neoliberals is now
gaining ground. This is reflected in the success of East Asian states, the
acceptance by the IMF and other international financial institutions of the need

9

10

11

Laos and Myanmar had average growth rates over 6 percent between 1991 and 2001, and
government officials may be beginning to realize the virtues of the EAM. Even North Korea
shows signs of change.
The BC, WC, and related terms such as neoliberalism and market fundamentalism mean different
things to different people, reflecting a lack of consensus even as to content, much less as to the
superiority of any particular approach. In addition to a pragmatic approach to reforms and
support for a larger role for the state in guiding the economy and ensuring equitable growth, the
BC has been used to refer to market reforms without democracy, an emphasis on selfdetermination to prevent powerful international actors from unduly influencing China's
development choices, and more problematically, a repudiation of the WC. See, for example,
Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beiing Consensus4-6, 11-13 (Foreign Policy Centre 2004).
John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?, 15 World Bank
Research Observer 251, 257 (2000).
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to consider the impact of their prescriptions on the least advantaged in society,
and the renewed commitment by developed countries to address global injustice
and the increasing gap between rich and poor countries.
The second issue is whether the principles of the WC should be applied
uniformly in all countries. The various crises in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil,
Russia, Indonesia, Thailand, and other countries that followed the WC most
faithfully, in contrast to the success of East Asian countries that adopted a more
pragmatic approach, have tilted the scales decidedly in favor of the view that one
size does not fit all. To be sure, diehard supporters of neoliberalism and the WC
continue to claim that these countries failed largely because they deviated from
neoliberal prescriptions and WC policies. Moreover, revisionists, including
Williamson himself, claim that the basic approach is correct but may need to be
modified somewhat in certain cases. This concession, however, narrows the gap
between the supporters of the WC and the EAM, though much depends on the
details of what may be modified and when.
Third, and relatedly, Beijing and other successful East Asian states have
followed many of the basic WC principles in whole or in part. Thus, we need to
avoid drawing too sharp a contrast between the BC and the WC. There is some
danger that in looking to China and other successful East Asian countries,
developing countries may draw the wrong conclusion. Having shifted too far to
the right in the past in adopting the neoliberal aspects of the WC, they may now
shift too far to the left, rejecting basic market principles, becoming overly
protective of domestic companies, and giving in to populist pressures for more
services and benefits than the state's limited resources will allow. This risk seems
highest in Latin American countries but can also be found in India, the
Philippines, and Indonesia, which have gone the furthest in recognizing the
justiciability of economic rights and in adopting the capabilities approach
championed by Amartya Sen and others.12
B. RULE OF LAW AND GOOD GOVERNANCE NECESSARY FOR
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH
Five East Asian countries or jurisdictions rank in the top quartile on the
World Bank's rule of law index: Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and

12

See the respective country chapters in Randall Peerenboom, Carole Petersen, and Albert Chen,
eds, Human Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal Study of Twelve Asian Jurisdictions,France and the U.S.
(Routledge 2006); Randall Peerenboom, ed, Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and
Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the U.S. (RoudedgeCurzon 2004).
See generally Amartya Sen, Capabifity and Well-Being, in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds,
The Quality of Life (Oxford 1993).
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South Korea. 3 This is an astonishing achievement given the well-documented
failures of the earlier law and development movement and its more recent
reincarnation under the banner of rule of law and good governance. 4 Apart
from North American and Western European countries, Australia, and Israel,
the only other countries in the top quartile are Chile and French Guiana from
Latin America, Slovenia as the lone (non-)representative from Eastern Europe,
and a handful of small island states and oil-rich Arab countries. 15
The seemingly random countries in this odd grouping have one thing in
common-wealth. All of the countries in the top quartile of the World Bank
rule of law index, including the East Asian countries, are high or upper-middle
income countries. This is consistent with the general empirical evidence that rule
of law and economic development are closely related (r = 0.82, p < 0.01)16 and
tend to be mutually reinforcing. 7 The relationship between GDP and rule of law
13

14

15

16

17

See

generally
World
Bank,
Governance & Anti-Corruption, available
online
at
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/O,,menu
PK:461646-pagePK:64156143-piPK:64154155-theSitePK:461606,00.html>
(visited May 7,
2006).
See Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge, Carnegie
Endowment Working Papers (Carnegie Endowment for Ind Peace 2003), available online at
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006). See also Tim
Lindsey, ed, Law Reforms in Developing States (Roudedge 2006) (declaring a consensus that many if
not most legal reform projects in developing countries have failed); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The
New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law", 101 Mich L Rev 2275, 2280 (2003)
("Despite billions of aid dollars, programs to promote the rule of law have been disappointing.");
Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalizationof Palace Wars-Layers,Economists, and
the Contest to Tranform Latin American States 246 (Chicago 2002) (stating that "most of the legal
transplants either fail outright or are largely unsuccessful," although allowing that optimists might
view the reforms as half-successful).
These include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands,
Malta, Martinique, Mauritius, Puerto Rico, and Samoa, in addition to Oman, Qatar, Bahrain,
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Several of the island states rely heavily on tourism and the
provision of financial services to companies looking for tax havens for economic development.
Most have populations between fifty thousand and five hundred thousand. See World Bank,
Governance &Anti-Cormption (cited in note 13).
r is a measure of the strength of association between two variables. It ranges from 0 (no
relationship) to 1 (perfect linear relationship) or -1 (perfect negative linear relationship). p
represents the probability that the relationship (in this case measured by ) is a random outcome
due to bad data. A small p-value (less than 0.05) is an indicator that the measured relationship is
not due to chance and hence considered statistically significant.
Based on time series data, a study has found that the causal relationship between institutions and
economic growth runs in both directions, although the impact of greater growth on institutional
development is stronger than the impact of institutions on growth. Alberto Chong and C~sar
Calder6n, Causait and Feedback between InstitutionalMeasures and Economic Growth, 12 Econ & Pol 69
(2000). See also Roberto Rigobon and Dani Rodrik, Rule of Law, Democray, Openness, and IncomeEstimating the Interrelationships,13 Econ Transition 533 (2005). A World Bank study agrees with the
finding that wealth matters to some extent but concludes that the causal impact of income on
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is actually stronger in the Asian region (r = 0.91) than for countries overall
(r = 0.82).
Some commentators have argued that China has enjoyed remarkable
economic growth in the last several decades, apparently without the benefit of
"the rule of law" and clear and enforceable property rights. 8 China's success
therefore calls into question the wisdom of spending billions of dollars on
promoting rule of law and good governance modeled on the legal systems and
political institutions found in Europe and North America. Accusing the apostles
of the revamped law and development movement of mythmaking, New York
University Law Professor Frank Upham claims:
I]his new rule of law orthodoxy linking formalist legal regimes and
economic development ignores the empirical evidence and is ultimately
counterproductive. Not only does the formalist rule of law as advocated by
the World Bank and other donors not exist in the developed world, but
attempting to transplant a common template of institutions and legal rules
into developing countries without attention to indigenous contexts harms
preexisting mechanisms for dealing with issues such as property ownership
and conflict resolution. 19
Yet the experience of China and other Asian countries suggests that rule of
law is essential for sustained economic growth. Even in China, the legal system
has improved significantly in the last twenty-five years, particularly in the
commercial area, to the point where China's legal system now outperforms
the
20
average in its income class on the World Bank's rule of law index.
The importance of rule of law to sustained growth does not mean that
poor countries need to import wholesale the political and legal institutions found
in rich states-they generally cannot and should not. Rather, they must take
advantage of local resources to develop institutions that respond to local needs.

18

governance is small and that "most of the correlation between governance and per capita incomes
reflects causation from the former to the latter." Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo
Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicatorsfor 1996-2004 3 (World Bank 2005), available
online
at
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters IV-main.pdf>
(visited May 7, 2006).
See, for example, Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the R'ghts Hpothesis: The China
Problem, 51 Am J Comp L 89, 91 (2003). For a discussion of the debates about the role of law as
opposed to other factors in China's development, see Peerenboom, China'sLong March at 450-512
(cited in note 5).

19

20

Frank Upham, Mthmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodo,%y, Carnegie Endowment Working Papers I
(Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace 2002), available online at <http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006).
The index is part of the World Bank's Good Governance Indicators. See Daniel Kaufmann, Aart
Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicatorsfor 1996-2002 (World
Bank 2003), available online at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3wber.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006).
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Nor does the importance attached to rule of law assume that any legal system
actually plays the role or lives up to the ideals sometimes suggested in civic
textbooks. Legal systems are complex. There is always considerably more
discretion, as well there should be, than some of the interpretations of rule of
law as a formalistic rule of rules would suggest. But as anyone knows who
attempts to establish a business, or who is arrested, or who wants to challenge
the government's seizure of his property in Bangladesh, China, or the United
States, rule of law matters, and there is a big difference in how well legal systems
meet the generally accepted principles of a thin rule of law.
C. DEMOCRATIZATION: GROWTH BEFORE FREEDOM
There are two competing versions of modernization theory. The first
emphasizes economic development as the motor for other reforms; the second
puts freedom and democracy ahead of economic development. The policy
implications of the two approaches are different. In light of the difficulties
sustaining economic growth and the long timeframes involved in reaching a high
level of wealth, the economics-first approach tends to be more patient and more
tolerant of authoritarian regimes, at least the ones that are able to deliver the
goods. The freedom-first approach is less patient and less willing to tolerate
non-democratic regimes, albeit subject to realpolitik compromises. The Bush
Administration's messianic promotion of democracy, for instance, entails
applying political pressure on governments to democratize. The Administration
rewards those that do, and attaches conditions to aid and imposes economic
sanctions on those that do not, despite the disingenuous claims that "America
will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling."'" At the
extreme, this approach supports humanitarian intervention and even regime
change, as in Iraq (although admittedly the desire to promote democracy seemed
to become a priority only after it was clear there were no weapons of mass
destruction and no linkage between Iraq and al Qaeda). To many citizens in
developing countries, and even to many Western liberals, this approach smacks
21

Bush shared his visions in his second inaugural address:
America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of
our founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this Earth
has rights, and dignity and matchless value because they bear the image of the
maker of heaven and Earth. Across the generations, we have proclaimed the
imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no
one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created
our nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the
urgent requirement of our nation's security and the calling of our time. So it is
the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal
of ending tyranny in our world.
President George W. Bush, InauguralAddress,2005 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 74 Gan 20, 2005).
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of imperialism. While not opposed to the use of coercion to pursue America's
interests, neo-conservatives find this normatively driven agenda excessively
idealistic and at odds with the realism that has been the cornerstone of American
foreign policy.
The second approach also tends to assume that individual freedom and
neoliberal economic policies are adequate, with little need for the state. Although
there is no necessary connection between the freedom-first approach and a small
state, the assumption that the two are correlated reflects, or at least reflected, the
dominant thinking among some of the leading Western economic powers. In
contrast, the economics-first approach tends to favor a larger role for the state in
setting economic policies, dealing with market failures, and ensuring equitable
growth, though again there is no necessary connection.
The experiences of Asian states tend to support the approach that
emphasizes growth as the motor for reforms and to disconfirm the freedom and
democracy first approach. Those countries that have attempted to democratize
at lower levels have failed in the past, oftentimes reverting to authoritarianism.
Indonesia tried democracy just after independence from the Dutch between
1950 and 1957. The experiment ended when Sukarno declared martial law.
Thailand went through numerous cycles of democratic elections followed by
military-led coups; there have been seventeen coups attempted since 1932. South
Korea held elections in the 1960s and early 1970s before returning to
authoritarian rule. The less-than-successful experiments with democracy in the
Philippines since 1935 led to the declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972.
In recent times, states that have attempted elections at low levels of wealth and
with weak institutions, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Cambodia, and
now Timor-Leste, continue to limp along with low levels of economic
development, pressing social order problems, and massive discontent with their
corresponding political systems.
The experience of Asian countries in this regard is consistent with the
experience of many countries elsewhere, 2 as well as empirical studies that show
that democracies are unstable at relatively low levels of wealth and vulnerable to
economic downturns.23 Democracies have a life expectancy of just eight years
when the country's per capita income is less than $1,000.24 Of the twelve
22

23

Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World 65 (Lynne Rienner 2003) (noting the remarkable fact
that "almost all third world countries have had at least nominally pluralist political systems at
some time in their history, yet the majority did not (or could not) build on these to establish
durable forms of democracy").
Adam Przeworski, et al, Democrafy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World,

24

1950-1990 (Cambridge 2000); Robert J. Barro, Getting it Right: Markets and Choices in a Free Socie
(MIT 1996).
Przeworski, Democray and Development at 78-127 (cited in note 23).
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democracies established prior to 1950 with a per capita income below $2,000,
eight failed. As some commentators have noted, "it is still striking how fragile
poor democracies are. In countries with incomes under $2,000, of the 116 years
during which declines in incomes occurred, twelve democracies fell the
following year."25 The longer the economic decline, the more likely the regime is
to fail.
Although wealth matters, this does not mean there is a particular point at
which countries necessarily become democratic. There have been and still are
rich authoritarian or semi-democratic states in Asia and elsewhere. Obviously,
many countries have become democratic at very low levels of wealth. And while
per capita income is the best predictor of the survivability of democracies, 26 a
few countries have managed to sustain democracy against the odds, including
India, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Botswana, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Papua New
Guinea. Other than India, these are all small countries with populations of less
than five million and several below one million. With some exceptions, these
countries tend to be relatively wealthy by developing country standards, to have
distributed wealth reasonably equitably, and to have invested in human capital
and effective institutions.27
25

Id at 111.

26

Countries with income over $4,000 per capita (PPP) that democratize are not likely to revert to

27

authoritarianism, and no country with an income over $6,055 has ever reverted. Id at 78-127.
Democratization in China is likely to be affected by various factors including the support or
resistance within the Party; the attitudes of non-Party elites; the views of the citizenry; the level of
economic development; the development and orientation of civil society; the political culture;
institutional development, including the extent to which the legal system is able to support the
requirements of a democratic order; and exogenous events, some of them foreseeable, such as
international pressures arising from globalization in the economic, cultural, legal, and political
spheres, and some of them unforeseen, including perhaps wars and new financial crises. I have
discussed the foreseeable factors elsewhere, conduding that China is not likely to become
democratic in the near future. I have also argued, however, that while democratization is neither
feasible nor desirable at present, China is likely to democratize in the long run for at least three
reasons: to overcome what is likely to become a growing legitimacy deficit, to address
accountability problems, and to ameliorate intensifying social cleavages. Peerenboom, China'sLong
March (cited in note 5). For a discussion of the various paths to democracy and the likely impact
of democratizing or not democratizing on a range of issues, see Bachman, China's Democratization
(cited in note 5), who believes gradual democratization more likely, and Gilley, who believes that
CCP rule will end with a bang rather than a whimper. Gilley, China's DemocraticFuture at 191 (cited
in note 5) presents a much more optimistic picture regarding the benefits of democratization,
while acknowledging the possibility of chaos and the probability of "much violence and many
deaths." He suggests that democracy will not fail in China, as it has in so many other developing
countries, although the transition to democracy "will likely be ugly, very ugly at first." Id at 153.
His optimism seems to be based in large part on the view that most third-wave transitions have
led to successful consolidation-a view dramatically at odds with the empirical record, and the
views of Diamond, Pinkney, and other scholars of democratic transitions, as discussed previously.
Gilley asserts that limited violence may be necessary and morally acceptable for a greater justice,
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D. RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Justifications for restrictions on civil and political rights in the name of
social stability and economic growth remain controversial. To be sure, successful
Asian states allowed certain sorts of freedoms during the authoritarian phase of
rapid economic growth, including some civil and political rights. Citizens were
allowed for the most part to associate with whom they chose, to speak their
minds, and to engage in religious practices, provided that in so doing they did
not challenge the state or threaten to disrupt social order. They were also able to
participate in politics in various ways, including standing for office in local
elections. But they were not given the right to stand for national elections or to
elect their leaders. In the few instances where they were given this right, the
outcomes of the elections were highly controlled. In short, citizens of successful
Asian states enjoyed considerable freedoms, including some political freedom,
but only in the context of a non-democratic or non-liberal system.
The situation in China today is similar. Chinese citizens enjoy considerably
more freedom than in the past. At the same time, the government continues to
impose-in some cases ruthlessly and with little regard for legal niceties or
international opinion-severe limitations on civil and political freedoms when
the exercise of such rights is deemed to threaten the regime and social stability.
Accordingly, China receives a very low score on civil and political rightsranking in the lowest 10 percent of all countries on the World Bank's voice and
accountability index. China scores poorly relative to many countries in Asia and
elsewhere, and relative to its level of economic development.2 8
Whether the future is likely to see more repression or greater protection of
civil and political rights depends in part on the outcome of deeply contested
debates about how to respond to the increasing social tensions, the sharp rise in
demonstrations, and the specter of a popular uprising such as the color

28

and that the world should be willing to pay the cost of "some degree" of chaos in China. He also
suggests Chinese citizens would find the "great deal of bloodshed" and the political, social, and
economic disruption worth it, just as people in other countries allegedly have. However, the many
polls showing widespread disenchantment of citizens in developing countries with democracy and
the willingness to sacrifice elections and civil liberties for economic growth suggest that many
people may not find the bloodshed and social disorder worth it. This is all the more likely to be
the case for Chinese citizens given the higher value placed on social order, the memory of violent
chaos and political instability for much of the last two hundred years, and the dire consequences
for social, economic, and political disruption on the hundreds of millions living below or near the
poverty line.
See World Bank, Governance &Ani-Corrupion (cited in note 13).
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revolutions in the former Soviet republics." Three dominant competing
perspectives have emerged.
One extreme emphasizes repression of dissent. Tight limits are imposed on
social organizations and the exercise of civil and political rights that threaten
political stability. This is combined with an ideological battle to win the hearts
and minds of Chinese citizens, government officials, and Party members by
revamping socialism and explaining the reasonableness of the current reform
agenda.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that rapid and
broad-ranging reforms are necessary to prevent the reform process from stalling,
to meet the rising demands from the citizenry, and to avoid a political crisis.
Rather than tightening restrictions on civil society and the exercise of civil and
political rights, this theory argues that the government should relax restraints.
A third, more moderate perspective acknowledges that China is
confronting a variety of serious challenges to social stability, as is typical for
middle-income countries. Hence, there is a need to maintain restrictions on civil
and political rights. At the same time, however, there is an equally pressing need
to continue to invest in human capital and institutions, to pay more attention to
social justice and the wealth effects of economic reforms, and to gradually
expand civil and political liberties. In short, stick to the EAM. Repression alone
does not provide a long-term solution. It simply increases the likelihood of some
sort of political crisis or that China will end up like other stable but
dysfunctional middle-income countries. At the moment, the moderate approach
appears dominant. Despite the tightening in some areas, reforms have continued
in other areas.
The moderate approach inevitably will give rise to criticisms from both
those who think the government is being too repressive and slow to implement
reforms, and from those who take the opposite view. Almost everyone will
object to some specific policies or the results in particular cases. Maintaining a
balance will be difficult, and the short-term is likely to be rocky. However, Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs have shown that authoritarian regimes
are able to achieve economic growth and postpone democracy by providing
standard public goods-such as public transport, public health, and primary and
secondary education-while controlling public goods necessary for political
coordination, such as civil and political rights and a free press.3 ° An authoritarian

29

Color revolutions are mainly nonviolent movements that first developed in post-Communist
eastern European states. Nevertheless, the government in China fears popular uprisings that
might lead to mass demonstrations calling for political change.

30

A study found that restricting coordination goods does not prevent economic growth, except at
the highest levels of per capita income. The authors recommend attaching conditions to
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regime that ensures economic growth and restricts coordination goods has a
substantially higher chance of survival, whereas allowing freedom of the press
and civil liberties decreases the regime's chance of survival by 15 to 20 percent.3'
The experiences of Asian countries suggest that, at least up to a point, this
strategy produces better results than democratization at low levels of wealth. Of
course, in some cases authoritarian regimes may impose too many restrictions or
unjustifiably delay the transition to democracy.
Democracy proponents claim that a democratic China could implement
similar reforms while maintaining political and social stability. Policies such as
investing in human capital and institutions, attending to inequalities arising from
economic globalization and the transition to free markets, and forcing through
difficult economic and legal reforms could be achieved without repression.
Unless China democratizes in the near future, we will never know if they are
right. However, the empirical record of other countries that have democratized
at lower levels of wealth, including countries in Asia, suggests that the more
likely result would fall considerably short of the noble aspirations of democracy
advocates. Democracy advocates might attribute the empirical shortcomings in
other countries to a stunted form of electoral democracy; what is needed, they
argue, is a more genuinely democratic system, a substantive or progressive
democracy that gives voice to and addresses the concerns of the poor and
marginalized. However, substantive democracy exists as an ideal rather than a
reality, especially in developing countries that lack the resources to provide
robust welfare benefits. These countries lack the ability to provide services to
individuals that are necessary for maximizing individual capabilities. Chinese
leaders would have to be considerably less risk averse, and considerably less
pragmatic, than they are now to take the chance on democracy of any kind at
this stage.
E.

CHINA AS A MODEL FOR OTHERS?

There are aspects of China's experience and the experiences of East Asian
states in general that may be useful for other countries. For a variety of practical
and normative reasons, China's developmental path does not provide a detailed
international aid to force authoritarian regimes to allow greater civil liberties and press freedom.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, Development and Democray, 84 Foreign Aff 77
(Sept/Oct 2005). Aid conditions have generally not been very successful, with economic
sanctions often harming citizens in the targeted country. It is unlikely that authoritarian regimes
will be willing to hasten the end of their own regime by agreeing to such conditions. China in
particular is unlikely to accept any such conditions. China has generally been able to avoid most of
the conditions the Asian Development Bank or IMF has imposed on smaller, developing
countries that need financial assistance.
31

Id at 84.
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blueprint that other developing countries can easily follow. Although the general
economic approach appears sound, there are still doubts about whether there is
an EAM, and if so, whether the model contributed to or impeded economic
growth. Moreover, the model is stated at a level of abstractness that still requires
policymakers to make wise choices in light of the particular circumstances. East
Asian countries have diverged on specific policy issues, and other countries that
follow the model will as well.
Even assuming the soundness of the EAM, other countries may not be
able to or may not want to follow it. Unlike China and many other East Asian
states, most developing states that have democratized will not be able to restrict
civil and political rights in the name of social stability and economic growth.
Citizens of other developing countries may also object that the trade off is
unnecessary in their case or not worth it. In addition, other countries may not
have the political or economic power that China has to resist external pressures
to open the domestic economy to foreign competition. China is certainly
different than many developing countries in terms of size, political power, the
nature of its political system, and the degree to which it can control its own
economic destiny.
More fundamentally, each country faces unique challenges and
opportunities. Along the way, particular choices are made. Some institutions gain
power, some lose power; some segments of society are improved as a result of
reforms, while others are made worse off. Accordingly, the story of
modernization or law and development in any given country is inevitably a story
of poliics-and largely one of local politics. Thus, it is not likely that any single
model will apply everywhere. At a minimum, the model must be adapted to local
conditions. This pragmatism has been a key to the East Asian success.
Nevertheless, despite the differences among successful Asian countries and
between Asian countries and other countries, mutual learning is still possible.
F. THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH OF
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
China is entering the stage of the reform process where many middle
income countries have lost their way. China's rapid progress in improving its
legal system and good governance appears to be slowing, if not reversing. The
country's rule of law and good governance rankings were all lower in 2004 than
they were in 1998. The lower rankings may be a statistical anomaly or they may
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be due to subjective biases, but there are signs of reform fatigue and diminishing
32
returns.
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Kaufmann, et al, concede the difficulties of assessing trends in a particular country indicator given
the large margins of error. The decreases may be attributable to the addition of new data sets and
large margins of error (standard deviation of 0.12 for rule of law), with the latter the more
important factor. After new data sets were added, China's scores from earlier years were lower
than previously reported. For example, China's 2002 rule of law ranking is now listed in the 48.5
percentile rather than the 51.5 percentile previously given when the data came out in 2003. See
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III at Table 4 (cited in note 20); Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Maters IV (cited in note 17). Other indicators for 2002 are
anywhere from 2 to 4.5 percentage points lower now than when reported in 2003.
The World Bank index aggregates results from several other data sets that rely on subjective
judgments by business people and others familiar with China. Thus, there is also the possibility
that subjective impressions are out of ine with objective circumstances, particularly when it
comes to a technical area such as legal reforms. Non-specialists in particular might have been
disappointed that China's accession to the WTO did not create a miraculous overnight change to
a rule of law compliant legal system.
Moreover, although a single aggregate measure is useful in providing a very rough sense of the
quality of a country's legal system in relation to the legal systems of other countries, it may
obscure as much as it reveals. China is a huge country. Different areas of law are progressing at
different rates, with the commercial law area among the strongest and criminal law among the
weakest. The quality of the judiciary varies by the level of the court, the region, the division within
the court, and the type of case. Problems such as judicial competence, local protectionism, and
corruption mainly affect basic level courts.
For additional concerns about attempts to measure rule of law, see generally, Kevin E. Davis,
(forthcoming), available online at
<http://wdi.umich.edu/files/old/globalconf/papers/revised/Davis-Kevin.pdf>
(visited May
7, 2006).

What Does the Rule of Law Variable Measure?, - Mich J Intl L

33

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, GovernanceMatters IV (cited in note 17).
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China is not unusual in encountering obstacles and opposition to the
implementation of rule of law and good governance. In 2005, the authors of the
World Bank's ongoing study of good governance cautiously concluded that there
is no evidence of "any significant improvement in governance worldwide, and if
anything the evidence is suggestive of a deterioration, at the very least in key
dimensions such as regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption."34
Unfortunately, the law and development movement has yet to focus on the
particular issues confronting middle-income countries and how to overcome
these problems. Apart from wealth, what, if anything, do successful countries
share? Are there any discernible patterns among the successful middle-income
countries with respect to politics, legal systems, cultural characteristics,
institutions, colonial history, population size, or ethnic diversity? What
distinguishes the successful countries from the less successful countries in the
region? What are the obstacles (political, legal, economic, cultural, institutional)
to establishing a legal system that would compare favorably with those in the top
quartile? Even assuming wealth and rule of law are closely related, what are the
implications for policymakers? The empirical studies do not shed enough light
on how to achieve economic development or the particular institutional
arrangements necessary for a rule of law. Nor do they shed much light on the
path or sequencing of reforms.
II. CHINA AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Critics fear that China's emergence as a world power threatens the progress
made over the last fifty years on human rights. In this view, China is likely to
take advantage of its growing economic and geopolitical influence to defend and
advocate, even in the face of Western opposition, rights policies and a normative
vision of the world at odds with current rights policies based on secular
liberalism. This is already beginning to happen, they contend, most notably in
the heavily politicized debates over "Asian values" and in China's attempts to
influence the policies and restructuring of the UN's Human Rights Commission.
As a result, critics accuse China of adopting a strategy of divide and conquer,

34

Id at 14. The World Bank's country policy and institutional assessment ("CPIA") ratings measure
economic management, structural policies, public sector management and institutions, and
policies for social inclusion/equity. The overall CPIA ratings of developing countries improved
slighdy from 1999 to 2004. However, progress on governance and institutional reforms, as
measured by public sector management and institutions, while still marginally positive overall, was
the weakest of all indicators. Moreover, there are significant regional differences and differences
among countries within regions. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular lags behind in simplifying
procedures to start a business, securing property rights, strengthening contract enforcement,
establishing rule of law, and controlling corruption. World Bank, Global Monitoring ReportMillennium Development Goals:From Consensus to Momentum 6 (2005).
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where the concept of universality is sliced up "little by little, region by region, to
the point where there are few teeth left in the UN human rights monitoring and
implementation mechanisms. 3 5 We are, in short, heading for a "clash of
civilizations. 3 6
It is possible that China, whether democratic or not, might adopt a more
aggressive human rights policy based on differing ideologies and competing
conceptions and interpretations of rights as part of a cultural war with the
dominant United States, and a larger struggle for the hearts and minds of the
international community. Yet this is unlikely. China is more likely to focus on
bottom-line issues such as trade and national security. A rising China is not likely
to feel that the investment in academic debates about moral theory is
worthwhile. Although China has criticized the human rights movement for
being biased toward liberalism and has begun to strike back at the United States
by issuing its own critical report of human rights in the United States, it has
done so mainly as a defensive measure, on the theory that the best defense is a
good offense. It did not, for example, rush to join Singapore and Malaysia at the
forefront of the debates over Asian values, even though many of its positions
were compatible with the Asian values platform. Rather, China has sought to
portray itself as a responsible member of the international community through
increased participation in the international human rights regime. If anything,
China is generally perceived as being surprisingly passive in not formulating new
proposals or participating actively in international organizations except37 with
respect to Taiwan and issues that bear directly on its own national security.
As a strategic matter, the government is not likely to launch a frontal
assault on liberal democracy or seek to persuade others that liberalism is morally
inferior to communitarianism or some other view. There is strong support for
liberal democracy among the elite in international organizations, despite the poor
empirical record of democracies and the many existing critiques of liberalism
from both Western and Asian scholars.38 People tend to stick with what they
believe-which is generally what they grew up believing. Philosophical
35
36

Samuel S. Kim, Human Rights in China's Internalional Relations, in Friedman and McCormick, eds,
What f China Doesn't Democratize? 131, 143 (cited in note 5).
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of CitliZations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and
Schuster 1996).

37

See, for example, Alastair lain Johnston, American Scholarship on China's Partiepaionin International
Institutions (Chinese), 8 World Econ & Pol (Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi) 48 (2001), available online at
<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ejohnston/lWEP2.pdf>
(Chinese) (visited May 7,
2006).

38

Ironically, many Asian critics of liberal democracy were trained in elite Western universities,
where they were exposed to the arguments and discourses of orientalism, post-modernism and
post-colonialism, and to Western critics of democracy and liberalism.
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arguments are unlikely to persuade most people to change their fundamental
moral beliefs. Indeed, firmly held moral views are stubbornly impervious to
contrary evidence regarding the actual consequences of such views or arguments
in support of opposing viewpoints.
Even if China's government leaders were inclined to openly question the
merits of liberal democracy, China lacks a coherent, normatively attractive
positive ideology to export as a substitute. Attempts to advocate Asian values,
New Confucianism, and communitarian alternatives to liberalism have suffered
from the lack of a systematic, coherent theory. In contrast, despite significant
points of contention among liberals, there is a general sense that liberalism has
some proper intellectual foundations-although liberalism also benefits from a
halo effect, with people assuming that liberalism must be desirable because the
richest and most successful countries are liberal democracies. Whether in the
West or in Asia, communitarianism always seems less reputable and less
convincing because it lacks a systematic theoretical exposition. It seems more
like a marginal critique of liberalism than a credible, full-fledged alternative able
to stand on its own. We are still waiting for an Asian (Chinese, Korean, Thai,
Buddhist, Confucian, or Islamic) Rawls to synthesize values, beliefs, practices,
and institutions into a normatively attractive systematic alternative to liberalism
that is compatible with modernity and yet sufficiently distinctive to be more than
just a variant of liberalism. At present, Chinese citizens are much too divided
about the future of China to produce such a consensus. It will be decades before
China reaches a point of relative social, economic, and political stability to
produce the kind of thick consensus needed to articulate a credible alternative,
and before that alternative can benefit from its own halo effect. By that time,
China is likely to have democratized and become more like Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan on contested rights issues. If so, any normatively attractive
alternative to liberalism will contain enough common ground with liberalism to
avoid a "clash of civilizations." The debates will be more similar to the debates
between liberals and communitarians or conservatives than to the conflict
between communism and capitalism or Islamic fundamentalist theocracy and
liberal democracy.
For the near future then, China is likely to keep a low profile while it
consolidates power-so long as it is allowed to. China first articulated its rights
policy when forced to respond to the criticisms of the international community
in the wake of Tiananmen. The repeated attempts in Geneva to censure China
for human right violations have resulted in a refinement of China's critique of
the human rights regime, more aggressive counter-attacks on other countries,
more adept manipulations of procedural mechanisms in the UN human rights
system, use of growing economic clout to lobby other countries for support, and
investment of more resources to influence the operation and restructuring of
human rights bodies. Similarly, China's response to increased pressure from the

Vol. 7 No. 1

The Fire-BreathingDragonand the Cute, Cuddly Panda

Peerenboom

Bush administration and the international community to democratize was to
issue its own white paper on democracy.39 Like the earlier human rights white
paper, the democracy white paper emphasizes that political reforms must reflect
a country's particular circumstances, including the level of economic
development, institutional capacity, and cultural traditions. The report was
forthcoming in acknowledging shortcomings and the need for deeper reforms,
and described the many obstacles and challenges China faces as a developing
country. The paper also responds to the domestic audience pressing for rapid
political reforms, both by pointing out that reforms are taking place and by
warning activists not to push too hard for immediate, dramatic change.
The next major challenge for China is how to respond to the increasing
international and domestic pressure to ratify the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), ° which it signed in 1998. On the one hand,
China will continue to be criticized unless it ratifies the treaty. On the other
hand, ratification will inevitably lead to greater confrontation with the
international rights community by forcing China to defend more explicitly its
interpretation of a series of contested rights issues. Some reform-minded
Chinese scholars have argued that China could ratify the ICCPR without
attaching many reservations or statements, on the basis that China's constitution
and other laws already provide for virtually all of the rights set out in the ICCPR.
Besides deliberately downplaying the gap between formal laws and actual
practice, this view ignores the politics of interpretation. The rights in the ICCPR
are stated at a fairly high level of abstraction, and thus are subject to a wide
range of interpretation. The ICCPR Human Rights Committee ("Committee") is
charged with interpreting the ICCPR. The Committee's interpretations tend to
be decidedly more liberal than the interpretation of the Chinese government.
Although the Committee's interpretations are non-binding, they do carry weight
in the international community, and can and will be used to "shame" China.
Were China to ratify the ICCPR, it would most likely do so with either a blanket
reservation that the ICCPR has no domestic effect, as the United States has
done, or with a series of reservations and statements that greatly limit the
domestic impact of the treaty. Either approach is fraught with risk-the United
States has been widely criticized for its reservations, and China is sure to be
subject to considerably greater criticism.

39

40

State Council, White Paper:.Building of PolticalDemocray in China (2005), available online at <http://
www.china.com.cn/english/features/book/145877.htm>
(visited May 7, 2005) (hereinafter
Democracy White Paper).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Res No 2200A (XXI),
UN Doc A/6316 (1966).
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To be sure, Chinese citizens take tremendous pride in Chinese culture and
civilization. Once China has consolidated power, Chinese citizens, led perhaps
by charismatic nationalists demanding that China stand up to the United States
and its allies, might push their government to champion a rights policy that
reflects "Chinese values." Of course, not all 1.4 billion Chinese share the same
values, and people's values will change as China becomes wealthier and more
urbanized. Nevertheless, fundamental beliefs tend to change slowly. If so, then
China would most likely promote human rights policies that are less liberal and
more collectivist or communitarian, that offer states a wider margin of
appreciation on contested issues, and that reject a neo-Kantian deontic
justification for rights in favor of a more pragmatic approach. Ironically,
pragmatic Chinese are more likely to be genuinely tolerant of different lifeforms
than allegedly tolerant liberals.
Such a human rights policy would challenge the alleged universal consensus
on many specific human rights issues, or at least the consensus among much of
the cosmopolitan elite in economically advanced Western liberal democracies.
But whereas liberal critics see such policies as a dangerous threat to the
legitimacy of human rights, supporters see China's position as a necessary
corrective to the hegemony of liberalism and the neo-imperialistic tendencies of
the Western-centric human rights movement. Thus, neo-authoritarians, New
Confucians, communitarians, and even some members of the new left hope that
China may one day provide a viable normative alternative to the formal
democracy and liberalism that have failed to resolve the very pressing issues of
social inequality and human well-being for so many people in rich and poor
countries alike.
A. LEADER OF DEVELOPING STATES: THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL JUSTICE
Developing states see China as their natural ally in the struggle for global
justice. Given China's geopolitical importance and rising economic clout, China
is expected to play a leading role in the struggle to persuade wealthy countries to
take the right to development seriously. China's support is also viewed as pivotal
in the fight for fairer trade policies that do not result in increased
impoverishment of developing countries while the rich get richer. Poorer
countries want China to take a strong stand on issues such as access to patented
drugs, protection of cultural artifacts and local know-how not recognized under
the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
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("TRIPS"), 4' restrictions on the use of antidumping and safeguard mechanisms
to limit imports of textiles and other products from developing countries,
increased aid, and perhaps most importantly, the elimination of agricultural
subsidies and tariffs in developed countries. China, for its part, has been cautious
about assuming the role of representative of developing countries, doing so on a
case-by-case basis when the particular policy position favorable to developing
countries is consistent with China's general national interests.
Nevertheless, China's human rights policies will likely emphasize the need
to ensure the material well-being of all humans and to provide them with the
tools and conditions to succeed, in keeping with the principles of the EAM.
There is at least some hope that an increasingly powerful China, even after it
becomes a benefactor rather than a beneficiary, will continue to pressure the
international community to take seriously the right to development, to address
global inequality and to ensure that the poorest countries have adequate
resources to develop and maintain political and social stability. China has, for
example, canceled over one billion dollars in debt from African countries. It has
also emphasized the need to provide preferential treatment to Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam in the framework agreement to establish a free trade
zone with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"). And it has
made a number of pledges to the UN to assist developing countries, including
eliminating all tariffs on certain products, offering over ten billion dollars in
concessional loans and preferential export buyer's credit to developing countries
in the next three years, increasing aid and providing anti-malaria drugs and
medical assistance, and contributing to the development of human capital by
training professionals from developing countries.42
While optimists hope that China will emerge as a champion of developing
states, the more cautious simply hope that China avoids manipulating and
exploiting the international trade regime for its own economic benefit, or at least
does so to a lesser degree than other superpowers have in the past.43 Most likely
41
42

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Annex 1C: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).
For a detailed overview of China's aid to African countries, see Stephen Marks, China in Afiica-The New Imperialism, Pambazuka News (Mar 2, 2006), available online at <htp://www.
pambazuka.org/en/category/features/32432> (visited May 7, 2006).

43

The main beneficiaries of "free trade" have been already wealthy, developed countries. Between
1950 and 1990, 57 out of 83 countries with a per capita income of less than $2,000 remained
equally poor or became even poorer, while all but 7 of the 52 countries with higher incomes at
least doubled their income, and none became poorer. Przeworski at 270 (cited in note 23). By
2000, after another decade of free trade, 54 developing countries were poorer than in 1990.
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2003: Millennium Development
Goals: A Compact among Nalions to End Human Poverty, available online at <http://
hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03-overview.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006).
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China, whether democratic or not, will do what is necessary to solidify power
and protect its own economic interests, just like the United States and other
powerful countries, although it may be more generous and even-handed toward
developing states.
So far, China has adopted a cooperative attitude on economic issues.
During the Asian financial crisis, it maintained a stable renminbi (RMB) at the
expense of its own exports in order to mitigate the impact of the crisis on its
Asian neighbors. In the free trade agreement with ASEAN, China offered
unilateral concessions on over 130 agricultural and manufacturing products,
granted WTO benefits to countries that are not WTO members, and allowed
countries to reap the benefits immediately under an Early Harvest Programme.'
China has also imposed voluntary export controls on textiles, thereby effectively
relinquishing the lower end of the market to Bangladesh and other developing
countries. In addition, China allowed the RMB to float within a limited range in
response to American pressure, and sought a broad-ranging compromise with
the United States and the EU over textiles.
All of these actions are arguably explicable in terms of China's larger
interests. Maintaining a stable RMB during the Asian crisis and entering into a
free trade agreement with ASEAN solidified relations with neighbors worried
about a rising China. Strengthening regional ties thus both diminishes the
likelihood of conflict with the region and provides an offsetting balance to
American dominance globally and in the region. With increasingly higher
production costs, China may lose the lower end of the market anyway to
Bangladesh and other poorer countries. Apart from avoiding the imposition of
American tariffs on Chinese goods, China's adoption of a more flexible
exchange rate defuses inflationary pressures and fosters economic stability. A

Using various methodologies to measure inequality, seven out of eight studies by leading
economists found that global income inequality has increased as trade increases. Joel R. Paul, Do
InternationalTrade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development?, 44 Va J Ind L 285, 310
(2003). The gap is significantly larger if one excludes China and India, which account for much of
the growth in developing states. Adding insult to injury, developed countries continue to impose
unfair trade conditions on developing countries. Agricultural subsidies in rich countries alone
amount to more than three hundred fifty billion dollars, six times the total amount of official
developmental assistance and sixteen times the amount of aid to Africa. See Commission for
Africa, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Afica 27, 280 (2005), available online at
<http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html> (visited May 7, 2006).
Developed countries are simultaneously pushing developing countries to reduce tariffs on
manufacturing products and imposing tariffs on products for which developing countries enjoy a
competitive advantage. The average tariff on agricultural products is 14 percent in the US and 22
percent in the EU, although tariffs on particular products may be as high as 400 percent. Id.
44

Jiangyu Wang, China's Regional Trade Agreements: The Law, Geopolitcs, and Impact on the Mulilateral
TradingSystem, 8 Singapore YB Intl L 119 (2004).
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comprehensive textiles agreement allows all sides to avoid a series of WTO
skirmishes that could lead to a trade war.
There can be little doubt that China has already begun to flex its economic
muscles. It joined other Asian countries in raising a WTO challenge to the
United States over steel imports. It has used its economic leverage to prevent
countries from supporting Taiwanese independence and membership in certain
international organizations. It has also sought to establish a number of bilateral
treaties and various forms of strategic partnerships with countries from Australia
to Brazil for both political and economic reasons. A richer and more powerful
China will be all the more likely to use its growing economic resources to
persuade others to supports its policies.
B. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A non-democratic China will remain cautious about infringements on
sovereignty, sanctioning humanitarian intervention only when there is
widespread and systematic abuse of rights, most likely subject to approval by the
UN. It may also support governments that deal harshly with threats to social
order, in keeping with the EAM. 45 A democratic China might be more likely to
intervene and less likely to condone violent crackdowns to maintain order, but
that is doubtful.
Failed regimes present an interesting case. A stronger, more powerful
China, whether democratic or not, is likely to perceive failed states as a threat to
geopolitical stability, and a source of terrorism that could embolden separatist
movements in China. The initial response may be to address the problems
created by global inequality and a discriminatory trade system, and to provide
material and technical assistance to developing states. The government has, for
example, emphasized a "new security concept" that goes beyond traditional
state-to-state military concerns and includes foreign policies that emphasize
stability founded on a basis of mutual respect and economic development. 46 A
hegemonic China, however, may not have much patience for those states that
fail to invest in human capital and institutions, or squander resources because of
grand political corruption or ineptitude. In such cases, China might either simply
walk away, if the risks to China are minimal, or seek to replace the existing
regime, if the risks are greater.

45

46

See, for example, C.J. Chivers, China Backs UZbek, Splitting with U.S. on Crackdown, NY Times A3
(May 25, 2005) (noting that China offered support for President Islam A. Karimov of Uzbekistan,
who was facing criticism for a crackdown against an antigovernment rally).
Yizhou Wang, ed, Constructon within Contradicion:Multiple Perspectives on the Relaionsbip between China
and InternationalOrganizafions41 (China Development 2003).
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III. GEOPOLITICAL STABILITY
Will China be aggressive toward the United States and its neighbors? All
one can say for sure is that only time will tell. The claim that China has never or
rarely engaged in aggression in its long history is surely a one-sided view of how
China came to possess Tibet and Xinjiang, much less of the military conflicts
with Korea in 1950, India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in
1979 and 1988. Although China has avoided military conflict since 1989, it fired
missiles and engaged in war games in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s, and
had a number of non-military skirmishes with its neighbors over various islands
in the region.
By way of comparison, in the last twenty-five years, the United States has
been involved in some forty military actions, including wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Yugoslavia, regime-changing invasions in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, military
assistance to rebel groups in Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, and missile
attacks on Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Sudan.4"
During the war in Yugoslavia, NATO mistakenly bombed the Chinese
embassy, although many Chinese to this day believe the bombing was intended
to send China a lesson for blocking American efforts to obtain UN approval for
intervening.4 8 In 2001, an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter plane
collided some seventy miles off China's coast, causing the Chinese plane to crash
and killing its pilot, while forcing the American plane to make an emergency
landing in Chinese territory. Chinese authorities detained and questioned the
crew and searched the plane, notwithstanding protests from the United States.
After the United States issued an apology, the Chinese government released the
crew and the plane.49 The United States has never, however, formally apologized
for the 1993 Yinhe incident, when the United States Navy stopped and boarded
a Chinese freighter believed to be carrying illegal chemicals, although no
chemicals were found on board."0 Such incidents have led to impassioned
denunciations of the United States in Internet chatrooms and calls for Chinese
leaders to stand up to what some Chinese see as American bullying and
intimidation. It is possible that the rise of nationalism may cause Chinese leaders
47
48

Zoltin Grossman, From Wounded Knee to Iraq:A Century of U.S. Militagy Interventions, available online
at <http://www.uwec.edu/grossmzc/interventions.htnl> (visited May 7, 2006).
NATO Hits Chinese Embay, BBC News (May 8, 1999), available online at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/338424.stm> (visited May 7, 2006).
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China to Free U.S. Spy Plane Crew, CNN News (Apr 11, 2001), available online at <http://
archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/11/air.collision.03/index.html> (visited May
7, 2006).
The Incident of 'Yinhe", COSCO Group, available online at <http://www.cosco.com.cn/
en/knowledgebase/detail.jsp?docld=1091> (visited May 7, 2006).
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to be more aggressive in standing up to the United States and other states in the
future.
Supporters of the democratic peace theory would argue that a democratic
China would not be a risk to geopolitical stability, or at least would be a lesser
risk. Yet China becoming democratic is no guarantee of peace. The democratic
theory may hold for wealthy, consolidated democracies, but it does not hold for
poor and unconsolidated democracies, which are prone to internal and external
conflicts.51 Moreover, China would not be just any democracy, but a new upstart
challenging American hegemony. Major powers go to war more often than
minor powers, especially when the dominance of the existing hegemon is being
challenged.
One potential conflict is over increasingly scarce oil and natural resources.
Some fear China's quest to secure oil and other resources will cause China to
support dictators. According to US Congressman Christopher Smith:
China is playing an increasingly influential role on the continent of Africa
and there is concern that the Chinese intend to aid and abet African
dictators, gain a stranglehold on precious African natural resources, and
undo much of the progress that has been made
on democracy and
52
governance in the last 15 years in African nations.
How or why China's policies would be any different than the policies to date of
the United States and other G8 countries is not clear. Presumably critics fear
that as an authoritarian socialist state, China is less concerned about democracy
and human rights than the United States and European countries are. Yet
Western countries' history of colonialism, support for dictators during the Cold
War, and continued support for authoritarian regimes in oil-rich countries in the
Middle East suggest caution in drawing any hard and fast distinctions based on
regime type. Whether democratic or not, China may very well end up working
more closely with some of the more authoritarian regimes in the world. If so,
however, the main reason will be that the geopolitical and economic dominance
of the United States and Europe leaves few alternatives. If China is not able to
buy companies such as Unocal from developed countries, then it will have to
look elsewhere to source its oil.
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Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder show that democratizing states-especially those that
democratize before establishing rule of law and other government institutions for checking
executive power-are significantly more likely to start wars than either democracies or
authoritarian regimes. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emeging

Democracies Go to War (MIT 2005).
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Jim Fisher-Thompson, China No Threat to United States in Afiica, U.S. Official Says, Bureau of
International Information Programs, Washington File (Jul 28, 2005), available online at
<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.htm?p=washfile-english&y=2005&m=Juy&x=
200507281821401EJrehsiF0.5898096&t=xarchives/xarchitem.html> (visited May 7, 2006).
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The most likely source of military conflict is the impasse over Taiwan. The
best way to avoid a conflict is to maintain the status quo, but domestic political
pressures in Taiwan are making that increasingly difficult. The 2004 election in
Taiwan demonstrated that the demand for independence is growing, and that
Taiwan's politicians may need to play the independence card to get elected. The
perceived wisdom is that there would be a greater chance for reunification if
China were democratic. However, reunification under even the most generous
self-determination framework would require Taiwan to relinquish de facto
sovereignty in many areas, and likely would not be supported by the majority in
Taiwan unless the benefits outweighed the costs of decreased sovereignty. Such
benefits would most likely be economic in nature, though perhaps the threat of
reunification carried out by military force also creates an unwelcome incentive to
reunify. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine any Chinese administration,
democratic or otherwise, ceding independence to Taiwan in the face of what
would almost certainly be massive popular opposition fanned by Chinese
nationalists.
While China might go to war over Taiwan, China is not going to export
revolution around the grobe in the hopes of spreading communism. Within
China, socialism as an ideology is increasingly incoherent and obsolete as a basis
for policymaking. The Cold War is over. At least, the first Cold War is over. If
there is going to be a new Cold War with China, political ideology and cultural
issues are not going to be the main sources of contention. The conflict will be
due to realpolitik concerns over national security and economic interests.
There is no shortage of contentious issues-on both sides. China objects
to American efforts to develop a missile defense system that would allow the
United States to fire nuclear missiles at China without fear of counterattack and
mutual destruction. It also takes a dim view of American efforts to create
offensive weapons in space and to deploy satellites that would disrupt other
countries' satellites, as well as arms sales to Taiwan. Nor does China appreciate
the American-led efforts to censure China for rights violations, American
pressure to let the RMB appreciate further, the limits on dual-use technologies,
agricultural subsidies to American farmers, the invocation of surge mechanisms,
or the reliance on anti-dumping cases to protect American industries.5 3 The
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The Ministry of Commerce sets out a long list of what China considers to be discriminatory or
unfair practices by the United States, noting the parallel to the demonization of Japan in the
1980s. Ministry of Commerce, Foreign Market Access Report (People's Republic of China 2005),
available online at <http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/table/2005en.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006). Bown
and McCulloch describe "unprecedented" discriminatory policies against China by the United
States that protect domestic industries and favor China's competitors, and argue that such policies
are likely to have unintended consequences for the global economy and American interests. They
note, for example, that Chinese companies face the most anti-dumping actions, are the most likely
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United States, for its part, objects to nuclear testing by China, arms sales to
countries that are not American allies, violations of agreements to prevent the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, market access restrictions, intellectual
property violations, and a host of other commercial issues. Meanwhile, each side
is warily watching the other's efforts to form alliances and enter into bilateral
and multilateral trade and security agreements in Asia.
Despite all of the possible sources of conflict, there are many areas where
the interests of both parties are aligned. Both China and the United States want
to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons and destabilizing the
region, even if they do not always see eye-to-eye on how best to achieve that.
The two sides joined arms, albeit for different reasons, in opposing efforts to
expand the UN Security Council. They are allies in the War on Terror. Neither
supports the International Criminal Court. Their cooperation is essential for
progress on global environmental issues and international money laundering.
Their economies are mutually dependent: Chinese purchases of United States
Treasury securities are underwriting American trade and budget deficits;
American purchases of Chinese products are fueling growth in China. Perhaps
most importantly, both sides share a common interest in continued stability in
China, and therefore in ensuring that economic, legal, and political reforms
continue.
History shows that the rise of a new power usually leads to conflict. Yet a
knock-down, drag-out battle with China for world supremacy is not inevitable.
This is a different era. There is less emphasis on territory as a source of power.
Economic globalization has led to greater codependence. A more developed
international trade regime has clarified many of the rules of the game, and the
WTO is available to resolve disputes peacefully. And thanks to the global media,
the world is better informed about what is happening.
Most importantly, there is a significant role for human agency in avoiding
conflict. Although there will inevitably be conflicts from time to time, major
conflict can be avoided if both sides are able to overcome their suspicions of
each other and work through their differences in a frank but open-minded and
constructive way. American policymakers will have to abandon neo-conservative
policies that seek to contain China, which is the surest way to bring about the
kind of military conflict and economic trade war that all hope to avoid.
Portraying China as a threat that must be contained fuels animosity and
undermines those constituencies in China working to ensure that China's rise to

to have duties imposed, and suffer the highest duties-a "China premium" of an additional 80
percent-making China "public enemy number one." Chad P. Bown and Rachel McCulloch, U.S.

Trade Policy toward China: Discriminationand its Impications 9, available online at <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=757124> (visited May 7, 2006).
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power is peaceful. The United States will also have to stop demonizing China on
trade issues and applying double standards on human rights, which only inflames
a vengeful nationalism.54 Chinese leaders for their part will have to resist the
tendency to dismiss every criticism of human rights violations or expression of
concern for Taiwan as an infringement on its sovereignty and an insult to the
dignity of the Chinese people.
Both sides will have to make greater efforts to understand each other.
Regular meetings of high-level officials, cooperative efforts on economic and
legal reforms, and private sector programs to train government officials are all
steps in the right direction. The United States-People's Republic of China
Cultural Engagement Act of 2005, 5" if passed, would be another step forward.
The Act would provide $1.3 billion over five years for Chinese language
instruction in American schools, increase American consular activity supporting
American commercial activity in China, and make it easier for Chinese scientists
to obtain visas to study at American universities.
In addition to trying harder to understand the other side, both sides will
need to be more self-critical about their own shortcomings with respect to
human rights, rule of law, trade, and external aggression. Neither side is beyond
reproach. Both sides have legitimate complaints and concerns. Both sides face
numerous obstacles in resolving their own problems and domestic pressures that
politicize and complicate the situation. More humility is needed, especially but
not only on the American side. American officials cannot just lecture Chinese
officials, as if they were recalcitrant children who needed to be reprimanded by
an older and wiser parent. There is a tendency to attribute differences with
regard to democracy and human rights to cognitive dissonance-"they just do
not get it." But there are legitimate differences in values and interests at stake.
Conversely, Chinese officials cannot rely on misty-eyed invocations of cultural
practices to allay concerns that China's rising will be far from peaceful, especially
while insisting that all American actions be viewed through the cold neo-realist
prism of state interests.5 6 Genuine dialogue is essential to work through these
54

See generally Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?,38
Cornell Intl LJ 71 (2005).
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United States-People's Republic of China Cultural Engagement Act S 1117, 109th Cong, 1st Sess
(May 25, 2005).
Shaojun Li provides a fairly typical account of what many Chinese perceive to be their more
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ethical approach toward foreign relations:
Strategic culture can explain many things that cannot be explained by
realpolitik or realism. In fact, realpolitik and realism in international relations
do influence China's choices of nuclear arms control and disarmaments, but
the development model of Chinese civilization and the traditional political
culture influence Chinese behavior as well. A contrast of the two reveals that
the latter influence is at a much deeper and substantive level.... During the
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issues. Politicizing debates, reducing complex issues to sound bites, exaggerating
problems, distorting facts, and demonizing the other side do not help.57
historical process of thousands of years of Chinese civilization, invasions by
peripheral tribes and punitive expeditions by central dynasties were common
occurrences.... According to historical records, Chinese dynasties sometimes
engaged in war, but most times implemented policies of peace with peripheral
tribes, such as establishing friendly relations, trading, intermarrying, enfeoffing,
and moving them to the hinterland. The trade-off between war-like policies
and peaceful policies consisted of the following: (1) China engaged in wars
generally under conditions beyond its endurance. The basic purpose was to
remove external threats, not to expand territory. Therefore, the Chinese
military would always return after a victory. (2) For the Chinese dynasties, war
was a means and peace was [the] object. The ancient politicians knew that
invaders would return if peace were not established. After winning a battle
China would seek a friendly relationship and indicate its power and kindness.
(3) During conflicts with peripheral tribes, China emphasized its civilizing role.
Ancient Chinese politicians thought that China could realize unification
"under Heaven" through the spread of its culture, which was characterized by
benevolence.
Shaojun iU, International Regimes of Nuclear Nonproliferation and China, in Wang Construction within
Contradiction69-70 (cited in note 46).
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The Schumer report on the "one-way street" for foreign investment is an example of a political
hack job that hinders rather than facilitates resolution of tough trade issues. The report contains
serious misstatements of PRC foreign investment laws that anyone with the slightest familiarity
with Chinese business would know are clearly false, such as that PRC law forces foreign
companies to enter into a joint venture with a Chinese partner rather than allowing them to set up
wholly foreign-owned companies. Charles E. Schumer, China's One-Way Street on Foreign Direct
Investment and MarketAccess: China's Government Imposes High Hurdles to ForeignInvestment and Business
in China, Particulary in America's Most Advanced Industries (2005), available online at
<http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special-reports/2005/08.18.05%20C
hina%20Report.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006). The whole notion of foreign investment being a oneway street because China does not allow or excessively restricts foreign investment is absurd.
According to the Ministry of Commerce, over forty-five thousand US companies have set up
companies in China, with almost four thousand in 2004 alone. In contrast, 883 Chinese
companies have set up shop in the US, and only 87 in 2004. The total amount of contracted
foreign direct investment from US companies is almost $100 billion, in comparison to $1 billion
for Chinese investors in the US.
China stands out among developing states, including East Asian states during their economic
rise, for its openness to foreign investment and import trade. Its average tariff rate of 10 percent
is much lower than that of Argentina (32 percent), Brazil (31 percent), India (50 percent), and
Indonesia (37 percent). Its ratio of imports to GDP is almost 35 percent, compared to 9 percent
for Japan. In 2003, the ratio of the stock of foreign investment to GDP was 35 percent in China,
compared to 8 percent in Korea, 5 percent in India, and 2 percent in Japan. Ministry of
Commerce, ForeignMarket Access Report (cited in note 53); Lee Branstetter and Nicholas Lardy,
China's Embrace of Globalization, Asia Program Special Report No 129, 6 (July 2005), Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, available online at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/
topics/pubs/AsiaReport_129.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006); Martin Wolf, China's Rise NeedNot Bring
Conflict, Fin Times 1 (Sept 14, 2005).
On the other hand, amidst all the distortion and hyperbole, the report does raise the legitimate
concern that China limits or prohibits foreign investment in certain sectors to the detriment of US
companies, and has sought to encourage foreign parties to bring high technology to China,
though that is generally not a requirement for investment as the report states. Some of the
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Genuine dialogue means being able to air differences. There will inevitably
be hard negotiations as China continues its march to superpower status. Chinese
leaders and negotiators have demonstrated that they are no pushovers. They
have resisted foreign pressure to democratize, to mimic Western rule of law, to
subject infant industries to global competition, and to prematurely engage in
financial liberalization. The development process has been driven primarily by
domestic concerns, and what the government has perceived to be in China's
interest. That approach has been remarkably successful so far. But as China
grows, it will have to assume the responsibilities that come with being a
superpower and forego some of the self-interested policies (from greenhouse gas
emissions to violations of international labor standards to intellectual property
violations) that may be justified for developing states trying to catch up but are
not acceptable for one of the world's great economic and political powers.
Whether democratic or not, China's rise to power will present significant
challenges to the current world order. Perhaps the best reason for hoping that
major conflict can be avoided, despite the many risks, is that the costs to
everyone of failing to overcome the obstacles in a peaceful way are simply too
high.
IV. CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A
JOINT VENTURE
In a recent speech that may represent a change in United States-China
relations, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick encouraged China to be
a responsible stakeholder in the international order.58 In so doing, Zoellick
acknowledged that China is now a major power, drew a clear distinction between
China and the Soviet Union and rejected the neo-conservative view that China
can be contained as well as realist balance-of-power strategies. He also
acknowledged that China's economic policies, including a depressed currency
rate, have been beneficial to China, although warning that China has now
reached the point where it must compete on more equal terms. Though noting
that economic reforms must be matched with further political reforms, Zoellick
did not call for democratization now, instead suggesting a more businessoriented approach. This is in marked contrast to President Bush's recent speech
extolling the wonders of freedom and democracy in Taiwan and the remarks of
other American officials that China should look to democratic Asian countries
for the way forward-the irony being that the lesson China is most likely to

5

restrictions are clearly meant to protect infant industries, but the report does not consider the
substantive merits of such policies. Needless to say, the report does not address China's
complaints about US unfair trade practices.
Zoellick, Whither China (cited in note 3).
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draw from the experience of Taiwan and other Asian states is that
democratization should be postponed until higher levels of wealth are obtained.
Zoellick's speech is praiseworthy, particularly given the domestic political
context. After all, the Bush administration came into office with a policy of
China as strategic competitor. There is still talk among neo-conservatives of the
need to contain China, and ominous warnings from the Pentagon about the
dangers of China's attempt to modernize the military. Government officials on
both sides of the aisle as well as the American public are up in arms about
China's "mercantilist" economic policies.
Rhetorically, the tone of the speech was on the whole balanced and
measured, although at times Zoellick's remarks seemed condescending, preachy,
and hypocritical-such as when he cautioned that "China needs to recognize
how its actions are perceived by others. China's involvement with troublesome
states indicates at best a blindness to consequences and at worst something more
ominous."59
Substantively, China was offered a place at the table, but on terms that
decidedly served American interests: lower currency rates, more protection of
intellectual property, more transparency on military spending and plans, and
financial support for the war in Iraq, including debt reduction, even though
China opposed the war. Chinese concerns over American military and economic
policies were not addressed, while the many challenges that China as a relatively
poor developing country faces were briefly noted but quickly dismissed. The
message appeared to be: now that China is a world power, it should join forces
with the United States and other world powers to maintain the international
order that serves their interests, even if at the expense of other countries. China
should help the United States prevent other countries such as Iran and North
Korea from obtaining nuclear capabilities; it should uphold intellectual property
rights and support the international trade regime that has so greatly benefited the
rich; and it should cooperate rather than compete in securing oil and developing
other energy sources to avoid strengthening the hand of the oil cartels and
driving up oil prices. Zoellick also warned that until China toes the line, other
60
countries will be forced to "hedge relations with China.,
Zoellick's speech may provide the basis for a more coherent China policy.
At this point, however, China is being offered a minority stake in a joint venture
with little chance to determine major policies and few veto rights over key
decisions. As a nuclear power and member of the Security Council and one of
the America's leading trading partners, China is already a stakeholder. The
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United States may have to offer China more in the way of positive inducements
before China will sign on. It may also have to give up some of the more coercive
tools such as the annual censuring of China in Geneva for human rights
problems. If so, China might be willing to go along even as a junior partner-for
now. But at some point, China's leaders will want to increase their share in the
joint venture, and have more of a say over major policies and future
developments.
Whether China's rising is peaceful will depend in large part on the
willingness of the United States and other world powers to recognize and
accommodate China's legitimate interests and growing power, and to continually
renegotiate the terms of the venture accordingly. While the relative shares of the
existing powers may decrease, the hope is that they will still be better off with a
smaller piece of a much bigger-or better-enterprise. But even if China's rise
should lead to relative net losses for existing powers, the alternative of
superpower conflict is likely to leave all concerned less well off. For this venture
to succeed, all the stakeholders will have to be responsible.
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